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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The link between competition and investment is one of the most important relationships  
examined in economics. For more than two centuries economists have held conflicting views 
of which market structures create the most favorable environment for economic growth, while 
acknowledging that it benefits from investment in both infrastructure and innovation. 
According to Adam Smith’s fundamental lessons, competition guarantees that consumers’ 
needs are best satisfied, minimizing  the rents left to the firms. Economists of the Austrian 
school have criticized this view and instead emphasized that even more important than the 
competition structure is the competitive process. An even more skeptical view was offered by 
Schumpeter who argued that concentrated market structures are optimal and monopoly rents 
are a driving force that promotes economic growth. 
A parallel can be drawn between innovation and investment which then gives rise to two 
conflicting effects of competition on investment. First, strong product market competition 
decreases profits and then lowers incentives to innovate. Second, competition may provide 
firms with incentives to innovate to escape from competition in the product market. This 
“escape competition” effect dominates when the ex-post market power is relatively high while 
the opposite holds when the market is more competitive. The two effects are embedded in the 
inverse U-shaped curve between competition and innovation developed by Aghion et al. 
(2005) so the optimal degree of competition is intermediate. 
A look at the investment in infrastructure also offers a contrasted view on the benefits of 
competition. Alesina et al. (2005) studied the role that overall regulation, barriers to entry and 
public ownership play in investment for many nonmanufacturing industries (energy, 
transports, communication). They showed that competition-enhancing policies do promote 
investment. But studies more focused on the (fixed-line) telecommunications sector have 
highlighted a possible negative impact on network investment when market entry is promoted 
through local loop unbundling. Additionally, the impact of unbundling -- which can be seen 
as a competition-enhancing policy – on penetration rate is still under debate but seems to be at 
best negligible. 
Therefore, the impact of competition on investment depends both on precise competition 
enhancing measures and the type of investment at stake. 
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 Introduction I)
The link between competition and investment is one of the most important relationships to 
examine in economics. For more than two centuries, economists have had a conflicting view 
of which market structures create the most favorable environment for economic growth, 
acknowledging that it benefits from investment in both infrastructure and innovation. In 
particular, the question of whether the presence of large firms capable of extensive investment 
should be promoted or discouraged to protect small firms and preserve the competitive 
process, has been a central point of assessment.  
The problem is multi-dimensional but one should consider first and foremost what creates the 
optimal market structure. The answer may depend on the goal one pursues, such as protecting 
jobs, increasing consumer’s welfare, or increasing domestic firms’ profit. Assuming that there 
is consensual welfare function which the central planner can maximize, would not totally 
simplify the problem. Indeed, for a given technology, there is a presumption that un-
concentrated market structure is optimal, since this may encourage greater competition and 
deter collusion between firms. However, increasing returns to scale or the need to provide 
incentives for investment over the long-term may dissent from the initial belief.  
Part of the problem depends on people’s beliefs relating to the merits of competition for 
creating the right conditions to foster productive activities. A first theory, put forth by Adam 
Smith, praises the virtues of competition as a way to ensure both allocative efficiency and 
productive efficiency. Competition guarantees, more than other market structures, where the 
consumers’ needs are best satisfied and minimizes the rents left to the firms, providing 
consumers with the entire surplus created by trade. According to this first approach, the State 
(or the competition authorities when they exist) should both help small firms to survive and 
prevent the development of dominant firms, in order to promote the greatest number of firms 
on the market. This vision was developed at the school of Harvard and is known as the S.C.P. 
(structure-conduct-performance) paradigm (see Bain (1956)). It supports the presence of 
competitive markets and favors public intervention to keep the structure competitive. 
A critical view of competitive structure can be found in the ideas developed by the economists 
of the Austrian school. Following Hayek, these economists claim that the competitive process 
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is the most important aspect of competition. It means that the number of firms per se is 
irrelevant, only the possibility for a new and more efficient firm to succeed matters. 
According to this approach, the presence of large firms is not the sign of ill-functioning 
markets. It can originate from the fact that those large firms are more efficient than others, 
and therefore more successful. It can also be the consequence of cost structure displaying 
increasing returns.  
An even more skeptical view on competition is offered by Schumpeter. According to the 
author (see Schumpeter (1939), there are many situations where concentrated market 
structures – in particular the monopolistic structure - are optimal. There are two main reasons 
for this. First, as developed above, the presence of scale economies may lead to markets with 
a small number of firms. Second, and more importantly, the objective of obtaining a future 
monopoly position provides firms with strong incentives to improve their production process. 
This dynamic motive is at the core of the Schumpeterian argument. As firms expect to be 
monopolists in the future, they will invest/innovate today, for their own benefit which in turns 
benefits to the society. Monopoly rents – hence monopolistic structures – promote economic 
growth. 
From these various traditions and from the studies that have been done since, one can look at 
this issue from different perspectives. The most natural one amounts simply to search for the 
market structure most likely to foster investment. In spite of this apparent simplicity, this 
assumes that investment can easily be defined, and that all types of investment can be 
compared. This also assumes that the market structure is not affected by investment, while it 
will be necessary to distinguish between ex-ante market structure (before investment) and ex-
post market structure (after the investment). One of our goals will then be to discuss how 
investment is affected by both present and future market structures. This question will be 
linked to the nature of the investment. 
How market structure impacts investment has also to be tackled with respect to financial 
constraints. One of the Schumpeter arguments in defense of monopoly was that investment 
requires cash-in-advance spending and that only monopoly had access to large financial 
reserve. A counter argument would be to claim that, if the product market is profitable, any 
firm could go on the financial market and borrow the necessary amount. In fact, it is here 
necessary to specify both the potential financial imperfections and the impact of the market 
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structure on these imperfections. If a less concentrated market structure increases financial 
imperfection, a monopoly may be the firm the most able to invest. 
An additional perspective concerns the impact of regulation on the investment decision. The 
government may determine the numbers of firms on the market (for instance, by awarding 
licenses), but it may also affect many elements that matter in the investment decisions of the 
firms. For instance, by setting the rule of access for the infrastructure, the regulatory 
authorities have an impact on the returns firms can expect from investment. More globally, 
regulation affects the economic, legal and therefore financial environment. Public decisions 
are therefore keys in understanding investment, market structure, and the link between these 
two elements. 
To examine those various questions, we will present some literature on the link between 
investment and competition. This literature is quite restricted when taken in a strict sense, but 
rather large when investment includes innovating investment. This is the view that we will 
take in the report.  
In the first part, we will discuss the link between market structure and investment in 
innovation. Whereas innovation is only a limited part of investment, it is a useful setting to 
discuss the impact of competition. Indeed, as long as one abstract from property rights, there 
is no real difference between investment in innovation and the other types of investment. We 
will therefore consider this literature first by taking a pure theoretical point of view and 
looking at the comparative incentive to invest for firms in various market structures. Then we 
thoroughly discuss the famous inverse U-shaped curve approach developed by Aghion et al. 
(2005) mixing theoretical and empirical arguments. One major lessons of this study is that the 
investment incentives are driven by the comparison between ex-ante and ex-post rents, and 
empirically that competition should exist but should not be too strong. 
The second part of the report will focus on the investment in infrastructure. Using a more 
macro-founded framework, we will follow Alesina et al. (2005) and discuss the impact of 
various form of deregulation that promotes competition on the incentives to invest in capital. 
This theoretical study will be complemented with the empirical study of Alesina et al. that 
shows that competition enhancing policies promote investment. In the specific context of 
telecommunications, evidence from the papers of Grajek and Roller (2012), Nardotto et al. 
(2013), and Crandall et al. (2013) suggest that when competition enhancing policies take the 
particular form of regulated new entrants’ access to the incumbent fixed-line infrastructure at 
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the wholesale level the network investment may decrease. Such a decrease could be desirable 
if it obviates the need for potentially inefficient investments in duplicative infrastructures. But 
evidence from Nardotto et al. (2013) and Crandall et al. (2013) suggest that this network 
investment shift reduces the broadband penetration which is interpreted as a loss in term of 
consumers’ welfare. 1To sum up, two major points should be kept from the analysis. First, 
from a theoretical point of view, competition can be beneficial or detrimental for investment 
as the decision to invest depends on the incentives to modify the market structure. The 
incentives to invest are high if competition takes place at the pre-investment stage, while they 
are low if competition takes place at the post-investment stage. Second, at a rather aggregate 
level, the empirical analysis tends to promote the idea that competition is good for investment. 
But evidence from the telecommunications sector when competition is encouraged by 
ensuring new entrants’ access to the incumbent infrastructure, offer a much more contrasted 
view with a potential negative impact of competition on investment.  
 
 Competition and Investment in Innovation  II)
In the first part of this report, we discuss the link between the degree of competition on a 
market and the choice of innovating. This question is raised at a micro-level by focusing on 
the firm’s incentives. 
 
1. Replacement effect vs. Efficiency effect 
The way this question has been raised in the early literature amounts to compare the 
incentives of firms in various competitive contexts, mostly contrasting a monopoly situation 
and a duopoly situation. Two opposing views have been presented on this debate. First, Arrow 
(1962) showed that a monopoly is less likely to invest than a duopoly. Then, in a context of 
race for innovation, Gilbert and Newbery (1982) showed instead that monopolies were more 
likely to invest than their potential competitors. To understand this apparent contradiction, we 
present now the two contributions  
a. Arrow Replacement Effect 
                                                          
1 Coublucq D., Ivaldi M. and G. McCullough (2012) find similar results for the US rail Industry. 
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Arrow focuses on the pure gains from innovating assuming that this innovation gives an 
exclusive right of unlimited duration. In this specific context, there is no formal difference 
between an innovation and an investment who grants the firm an ex-post monopoly position. 
Moreover, Arrow models innovation as a cost-reducing method, which is very close to many 
forms of investment that decrease the cost of providing a good. Formally, in a model where 
firms produce at constant marginal cost, the innovation allows to decrease the marginal cost 
of production from cH to cL (with cH >cL >0). Arrow compares three situations. 
First, suppose that the decision to invest in this cost-reducing technique is chosen by a central 
planner whose goal is to maximize social surplus. If such a planner was in place, he would set 
the price at marginal cost, i.e. cH before innovation and cL after the innovation. The gains from 
the innovation are equal to the increase in demand induced by the fall in price. They can be 
computed as the additional demand when price falls from cH to cL. In this first benchmark 
case, investment will take place if the investment cost is smaller than the benefit of this 
increase in demand.  
The second situation is one where the market is run by a monopolist and the decision to invest 
is taken by this monopolist to maximize its own profit. In contrast with a hypothetical social 
planner, the monopolist will set the price above marginal cost. When the marginal cost 
decreases following investment, the monopolist will set a lower price but his gains will only 
be a share of the welfare gains as some of these gains are going to consumers. In contrast with 
a benevolent social planner, the monopoly only considers its own gain in the decision to 
invest. Therefore the monopolist’s incentives to invest will be smaller than the social 
incentives to do so. 
The most important situation, and the one to compare the monopoly case with, is when we 
assume that we start from a competitive situation. More precisely, we consider a market 
where a large number of firms produce a homogenous good. Prior to innovating, these firms 
compete in price so the equilibrium price is cH and there is no residual profit. By investing, a 
firm can get a monopoly position on the technology (but not on the good itself).2 
Two different cases must be considered. Suppose first that the monopoly price with the new 
cost, cL, is below the initial price, cH. It is then as if, by investing, the firm had escaped any 
form of competition. This case is called drastic or major innovation. Suppose instead that the 
monopoly price with the new cost, cL, is above the initial price, cH. This means that, in spite of 
                                                          
2 We assume that no regulation constrains the innovating firm once the innovation has been done. 
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his competitive advantage, the firm cannot freely choose its pricing policy and therefore will 
set his price at cH. From the innovating firm’s point of view, the situation is better than 
initially as he earns a mark-up for each sale but he does not totally escape from competition. 
This case is referred to as non-drastic or minor innovation.  
In the case of drastic innovation, the incentives of the competitive firm are greater than the 
incentives of the monopoly as the profit post-innovation is the same while the profit pre-
innovation is smaller in the competitive case. Therefore, the differential profit (hence the 
incentives to innovate) is greater in the competitive case than in the monopoly case. In the 
case of non-drastic innovation, the result is the same. Indeed, the difference in prices (and in 
demand) in the ex-ante monopoly case will be small whereas in the ex-ante competitive case, 
the final profit will fully reflect the cost differential while the pre-innovation profit is still 
zero. 
Arrow’s main point is the fact that the monopoly has less to gain in improving his position 
because he replaced himself when innovating. The replacement effect explains the smaller 
incentives of the monopoly – who rests on his “laurels” - compared to firms in a competitive 
situation3.  
 
b. The Efficiency Effect 
In the preceding approach, it was assumed that either the monopoly or the competing firms 
could acquire the innovation (or makes the investment). We suppose now that that the 
innovation can be performed by both firms. More precisely, we follow here Gilbert and 
Newberry (1982) and consider an initial situation with an incumbent and a potential entrant. 
They assume that either an incumbent firm or an entrant can invest to get a new technology. 
This investment can either be either direct - each firm performing some R&D which yields to 
race for innovating - or indirect - an innovation has been discovered by a third firm and an 
auction is set up to allocate this innovation. 
When choosing how much resource to devote to the investment, each firm considers not only 
the gains in case of success but also the loss in case of failure. In such a context, the failure by 
one firm is equivalent to the success of its competitor. This situation is akin to one where both 
                                                          
3 Note that, in the case of drastic innovation, the innovation of a firm initially in a competition situation has an 
impact on both the technology and the market structure. 
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the incumbent and the entrant devote some money to increase the speed at which they can 
secure a position on a market. For the incumbent, a success is equivalent to keeping the initial 
monopoly position with a more efficient technology. For the potential entrant, success allows 
to enter the market with a technological advantage on the incumbent (the former monopoly), 
with a new market structure characterized by an asymmetric duopoly. Looking at the 
differential profits, the gains from innovation by the entrant are simply the profit of the 
efficient firm in a duopoly with differentiated cost, denoted as ПD(cL). As for the monopoly, 
its gains are the difference between the efficient monopoly profit, ПM(cL), and the profits of 
an inefficient duopolist, ПD(cH). 
To compare the monopoly’s and the entrant’s incentives to invest, one must simply compare 
two expressions, ПD(cL) and ПM(cL) - ПD(cH). It turns out that the latter expression is always 
greater than the former. Indeed, the above comparison amounts to say that the monopoly is 
willing to invest more than the entrant if and only if ПM(cL)>ПD(cL)+ ПD(cH). This condition 
states that the profits of an efficient monopolist are higher than the profit of two duopolists 
choosing their strategy in an uncoordinated way. It is a very natural property, called the 
efficiency effect, which must be verified in any competitive model (see Tirole (1988)). 
Therefore, in a pure race for innovation, the monopolist’s incentives to keep his monopoly 
position are greater than the incentives an entrant has to become a duopolist.4  
From these two major contributions, it is difficult to draw clear-cut conclusions on the link 
between market structure and incentives to invest. On one side, there is the classical argument 
that competition fosters innovation and investment because this market structure gives the 
highest incentives to escape competition. On the other side, we find the Schumpeterian idea 
that the presence of ex-post rents is crucial to incentivize firms and, in this respect, monopoly 
rents maximize the incentives to innovate. 
Elaborating on these ideas, if the investment is very productive, i.e. very likely to generate a 
genuine new product (as in the drastic case), the efficiency effect is low as the efficient 
duopoly profit is close to the monopoly profit. One can therefore believe that the entrant will 
invest a lot. On the contrary, when the innovation is non-drastic, the monopoly is more likely 
                                                          
4 Vickers (1985) notes that this may not be true when more than one firm is initially operating on the market. In 
the case of initially Cournot competition, an entrant has more to gain from a non-radical innovation than one of 
the incumbent firms.  
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to invest than the entrant as the future gains of this latter firm may not be enough to justify the 
cost to be incurred.5 
Even if it seems natural to compare pre-investment market structures and profit with post-
investment market structures and profit, many innovations or investment do not 
fundamentally change the degree of competition. It is therefore useful first to find a model 
flexible enough to study the innovation incentives and second to be able to look at real data 
and settle the debate as much as possible. To this end, we will turn to more data oriented 
research, discussing in particular the contribution by Aghion et al. (2005).  
  
2. The Inverse U-Shape curve of innovation. 
a. Presentation of the earlier empirical literature 
As the theory seems inconclusive, many economists have tried to perform empirical studies to 
unveil the possible relationship between innovation and competition (see Gilbert (1986) for a 
comprehensive view). As a preliminary remark, one must observe that this relationship can be 
looked at from different perspective. For example, one can look at the link between R&D and 
on market concentration, even if it represents a highly imperfect measure of competition. 
Other studies focus on the relationship between R&D and firm size.  
The early articles, as Scherer (1965, 1967) or Mansfield et al. (1977) showed some tendency 
for R&D activity to be larger in moderately concentrated industries. Note that these studies 
were inspired by the SCP paradigm discussed in the introduction of this report and therefore 
quite favorable ex-ante to competitive structures. 
A second wave of studies, mostly in the 1980, improved the econometric methods and tried to 
control for effects specific to firms and industries. Scott (1984) showed that neither firm size 
nor market concentration was correlated with R&D intensity. Even if some researchers found 
slightly more significant results, the quest for positive or negative relationships between 
competition and R&D investment was largely unsuccessful. According to Baldwin and Scott 
(1987) “The most common feature of the few R&D analyses that have sought to control for 
                                                          
5 An interpretation in terms of investment would be that competition is good to generate new goods while 
monopoly is better to foster regular marginal increase of the production frontier. 
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the underlying technological environment is a dramatic reduction in the observed impact of 
the Schumpeterian size and market power variable”.6 
More recently, a third wave of article took advantage of more extensive data and better 
methods to control for the simultaneity of market structure and R&D. For example Blundell, 
Griffith and Van Reenen (1999) found that more concentrated industries produce fewer 
innovations, but larger firms (within industries) were responsible for more innovations. 
Nickell (1996) showed that an increase in market share was associated with reduced 
productivity (at firm-level) while greater competition (measured by the number of 
competitors) was linked to higher productivity growth.  
The use of natural experiments – the occurrence of an external event that causes changes in 
the industry - may be an interesting way to investigate the link between innovation and market 
structure. As an illustration, Carlin, Shaffer, and Seabright (2004) looked at the impact on 
performance and innovation of the privatization of State-owned firms in transition countries. 
Their results suggested that the presence of new rivals fostered innovation while the presence 
of too many competitors was detrimental to innovative activities. Although interesting, it is 
difficult to draw general lessons from these results as only some firms were privatized and 
this may lead to strong endogeneity biases. Moreover, management practices under public and 
private ownership sharply differ and may also be a source of difference in the outcome. 
MacDonald (1994) made also use of an exogenous policy event – a change in the US import 
policies - to assess the role of competition on the development of innovative products. His 
results suggest that a sudden increase in competition had significant positive impacts on 
technological progress for highly concentrated markets. Unfortunately, it is again hard to 
dismiss the endogeneity problems as imports respond to some factors that are endogenous to 
innovation. 
As it appears from the above studies, it has been very difficult to find a clear linear 
relationship between competition (taken with different forms) and innovation. Moreover, 
these empirical works also failed to delivered theoretical models in line with their results. The 
article by Aghion et al (2005) tries both to provide a global inquiry – with theoretical and 
empirical results – and to go beyond the usual linear relationship.   
 
                                                          
6 Even if competition policy could reasonably be adjusted to the technological environment, the quest for 
correlation or causality between competition and innovation in unregulated environment should abstract from 
this element. 
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b. The Model by Aghion et al. (2005) 
The model by Aghion et al. (2005) is grounded into the Schumpeterian tradition revitalized by 
the endogenous growth literature (Romer (1990), Aghion-Howitt (1992) and Grossman-
Helpman (1991)). This literature links higher product market competition to lower post-entry 
rents and lower incentives to innovate. But on top of this well-known idea, the model adds the 
escape-competition effect whereby a firm in a competitive market wants to innovate to 
differentiate from its competitors.7 The combination of those two effects will lead to the 
inverse U-shape curve. 
To obtain this curve, the authors model a situation where two firms operate on a market.8 The 
firms are characterized by their production functions which depend on the technological level. 
The authors consider two possible technological situations. In the first one, both firms are at 
technological par with one another. There is no leader or follower and this situation is referred 
to as leveled or neck-and-neck. In the second situation, called unleveled, one firm (the leader) 
lies ahead of its competitor (the follower). The technological situation is not set once for all. 
Indeed, at each period, firms can devote some resource to innovation, and may thereby 
increase their productivity. A first important assumption of the model is that the gap between 
the two firms never exceeds one technological level. Therefore, if a leading firm innovates, 
the follower will automatically get access to the (now) old technology of the leader. 
One of the common difficulties of the articles that study the relationship between competition 
and innovation is to choose how to model competition. As the number of firms is fixed in 
Aghion et al. (2005), the degree of competition in an industry is not measured by a standard 
Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI). It is modeled instead by the actual behavior of the firms, 
and their ability to maintain high prices. More precisely, consider first the situation where 
there is a technological leader. In this case, competition is soft but only the leader can make 
some profit. The most interesting case lies when the industry is leveled. Then, the degree of 
product market competition is inversely related to the degree to which the two firms are able 
to collude. If there is no collusion (or more generally any limit to competition, such as 
informational problems or switching costs), then Bertrand competition with identical products 
                                                          
7 Notice that the escape-competition effect is reduced if the firm anticipates that regulatory authorities will 
promote competition in the new firm’s environment. This commitment problem associated to authorities’ future 
behavior is not specific to the situation investigated in this report but may exist as soon as the relationships are 
repeated. 
8 In the model, there are in fact many goods each using two intermediate goods produced in a duopoly industry. 
We abstract from these complexities and present the model as if there was only one market.  
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drives the industry profit to zero. On the contrary, if the collusion is perfect, the firms will 
share equally the monopoly profit. The competition is therefore parameterized by the fraction 
of a hypothetical leader’s profit that a level firm can reach through collusion. 
This model allows combining the Schumpeterian Effect – more competition meaning less rent 
and thus less incentives to innovate – and the “Escape Competition” Effect – more 
competition decreases the current profit and increases the incentive to innovate to gain a 
technological advantage.  
More precisely, consider an initial situation where competition is soft, meaning that collusion 
is high on the market. When the firms have the same technology (the neck-and-neck 
situation), the marginal gain from innovation is small and the pace of investment is quite 
limited. If competition were increased, the pre-innovation rents would decrease, increasing 
the incentives to innovate and as a consequence the resource devoted to this. If the firms have 
different technologies, the follower has more incentive to innovate in this situation than in the 
case where tough competition prevails.  
Consider instead the case where there is no collusion in the product market, i.e. the case of 
tough competition. When the firms have the same technology, the current profits on the 
market are small (equal to zero if there is no collusion at all) so the incentives to innovate to 
escape competition are high. In contrast, if the situation is unleveled with one leader and one 
follower, the latter firm has no incentives to spend some money for innovation as the returns 
will be low. 
Let us summarize the main patterns of this theoretical model. Increasing competition can 
foster innovation where firms are neck-and-neck, i.e. when the production function is the 
same across firms. But when firms are technologically heterogeneous, it is better to decrease 
competition in order to foster innovation from the laggard firm.  
 
c. The empirical U-shaped curve. 
Aghion et al. (2005) tries next to assess the empirical relevance of their theory. They use a 
panel of more than 300 British firms over the period 1973-1994. Two important elements of 
the theoretical model, the measure of innovation and the degree of competition, should be 
carefully designed for the empirical test. First, to measure innovation intensity, the authors 
use the average number of patents taken out by firms in an industry and each patent is 
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weighted by the number of times it has been cited by another patent. Even if this measure 
does not give a precise information on the innovative input (both human and financial), it 
seems a good surrogate index. Second, it is important to clarify the nature of product market 
competition. In many articles, competition is measured by indicators such as market share and 
concentration index (as the HHI). To be in line with their theoretical model, Aghion et al. 
(2005) measures the degree of competition using a Lerner type of index. To construct the 
index, they compute the ratio between operational profits net of financial cost9 divided by 
sales and then take the average of this index across firms in the industry. Using 1-Lerner as 
the precise measure of competition, a value of 1 indicates perfect competition while values 
below 1 indicate some market power. Allowing for a non-linear specification of the 
relationship between innovation (the Y-axis) and competition (the X-axis), leads to Figure 1. 
 
 
 Figure 1: The figure plots a measure of competition one the x-axis against citation-
weighted patents on the y-axis. Each point represents an industry-year.  
 Source: Aghion et al. (2005). 
 
                                                          
9 Financial costs include depreciation, provisions and an estimated financial cost of capital. 
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In spite of the usual dispersion, one can see (and check more formally from the estimations) 
that the relation between competition and innovation is first increasing and then decreasing. 
One use to say that the relation is an inverse U-shape. 
In the competition/innovation debate, the possible endogeneity is a recurrent issue. Indeed, 
one could argue that innovation allows a decrease in competition so that the negative 
relationship (if any) should not be interpreted as a causal one in the usual sense. Aghion et al. 
(2005) used exogenous change in the intensity of competition (privatizations, EU single 
market programs, Monopoly and Merger Commission investigations that influenced the 
market) and show that competition/innovation curve still displayed the same inverse U-shaped 
pattern. 
The data also give an interesting prediction on the technological spread in an industry. 
Indeed, it appears that the average technology gap between leaders and followers is an 
increasing function of the overall level of competition. To explain this fact, one can use again 
the insights from the theoretical model. A high degree of competition means that the profit 
will be low if both firms have the same level of technology. It implies that investment will be 
high in this case (the escape-competition effect). At the opposite, when the industry is 
unleveled, the follower is discouraged to invest because the returns will be low. A high 
degree of competition goes therefore hand-in-hand with a large technological gap within the 
industry.   
This part has focused on innovation investment. The link between investment and the amount 
of innovation is not straightforward because innovation is subject to a random process. 
Another major form of investment, namely infrastructure investment, offers the possibility to 
discuss the link between investment and several forms of regulation or deregulation that each 
promotes competition. 
 
 Competition and  infrastructure investment  III)
Infrastructure investment determines the level of firms’ physical capital. A particular 
company’s choice of infrastructure level depends on the structure of the market it belongs to. 
A monopoly accumulates physical capital to an extent that may differ from the one that would 
have been chosen by a firm that only covers a small part of a highly competitive market.  
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Regulatory authorities (the government for short) can influence competition and therefore the 
level of infrastructure investment in several ways. For instance, the regulator can erect 
barriers to entry by determining administratively the number of firms through a grant of 
licenses. It can also establish a system of standards, administrative procedures, red tape and 
other forms of regulatory burdens that increase firms’ input costs and/or firms’ costs of 
adjusting the capital stock. Such a regulation can in addition hamper firms’ capacity to react 
to changes in fundamentals. The regulator can also impose a ceiling on the rate of return on 
capital by setting an upper bound on the ratio profit/capital that firms are allowed to earn. 
Government intervention can be even more intense when it owns all or part of the company's 
capital. In all these examples the implemented regulation reduces competition. There is also 
some specific regulation that promotes competition as for instance when the new entrants are 
provided access to incumbent infrastructure.  
Over the past two decades many OECD countries experienced governmental measures 
(mostly deregulation) in industries that require heavy infrastructure investments, as for the 
sector of aerospace, railways, postal, telecommunications, electricity, and gas. A natural 
question is: what is the effect of such measures on infrastructure investment? 
One can expect that deregulation (respectively, regulation) does not produce the same effect 
whenever it consists in suppressing barriers to entry, reducing the cost of capital adjustment, 
removing the ceiling on the rate of return that can be earned on capital, or reducing the State 
shareholding in the company (respectively, providing new entrants with access to incumbents’ 
infrastructure).  
In what follows, we first present a theoretical analysis of the effect of deregulation on 
infrastructure investment depending on what deregulation consists in through the papers of 
Alesina et al. (2005). Second, we present an empirical treatment of this issue. We start with 
the paper of Alesina et al. (2005) that studies data from 1975 to 1998 for several 
nonmanufacturing industries in 21 OECD countries. Then we focus on three empirical studies 
in the telecommunication sector. Grajek and Roller (2012) examines the effect of access 
regulation on infrastructure investment in 20 European countries from 1997 to 2006. Nardotto 
et al. (2013) explores the impact of local loop unbundling on both broadband penetration and 
the quality of service by using data from 2005 to 2009 in UK. Crandall et al. (2013) examines 
the effects of copper-loop unbundling on household broadband penetration rate in OECD 
countries from 2001 to 2010. 
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1. Theoretical analysis 
The article by Alesina et al. (2005) offers a model in the spirit of endogenous growth 
literature. In their approach, there are several monopolistic competitive firms10, each 
producing a differentiated product by choosing capital and labor to maximize present 
discounted value of future profits. This model assumes that the elasticity of demand increases 
with the number of firms. The underlying idea is that a higher number of producers extends 
the range of products available to consumers. This variety increases the elasticity of 
substitution between products - the consumer has access to more substitutes - and thus the 
elasticity of demand that each firm faces increases. It is also assumed that tougher regulation 
increases the cost of capital adjustment. This seems natural when the regulation takes the form 
of standards that the company’s capital must satisfy. Finally, it is assumed that marginal 
productivity of capital is decreasing. This implies that as an additional unit of capital is added 
to a fixed labor supply, the gain in output is positive but less than the extra output generated 
by the addition of the previous unit of capital.  
In this context, the authors study how infrastructure is impacted by different types of 
deregulation.  
 
a. Reducing barriers to entry and/or the cost of capital adjustment 
Regulatory reforms that result in reduction in (administrative) barriers to entry tend to 
stimulate capital accumulation and then infrastructure investment. Indeed, lowering barriers to 
entry increases the number of firms. The initial capital of a new entrant reproduces somehow 
a capital already used by incumbents. In addition, capital accumulation by entrants more than 
offsets the potential decline of incumbents’ capital as the marginal productivity of capital is 
assumed to be decreasing. Thus, at the aggregate level, both the capital stock and the level of 
infrastructure investment increase. 
A lower cost of capital adjustment produces the same effects on the capital stock and the level 
of infrastructure investment. Because any reduction of the adjustment cost decreases firms’ 
cost of investment so the firms choose, in fine, a higher level of investment. 
                                                          
10 Monopolistic competition is a particular form of imperfect competition that limits the strategic interaction 
between the firms. It applies well to the cases where products are differentiated and the cost structure exhibits 
important fixed costs. 
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b. Capital market imperfections  
We just concluded that a deregulation opening markets to competition stimulates investment. 
This might be surprising because we could have imagined that tougher competition - by 
reducing profits - would rather compel firms’ ability to invest and thus have a negative effect 
on investment. But this is not the case in the absence of capital market imperfections. 
Provided it is sufficiently profitable, any project can be financed through external funds. 
Firm’s ability to invest is then no hampered by current low markups of prices over marginal 
costs. However, in a context of capital market imperfections the cost of external source of 
finance (the interest rate of the loan) cannot exceed the cost of internal source of finance (the 
opportunity cost of equity financing). This difference between the costs of external and 
internal sources of finance originates from information asymmetries. Having no access to the 
information privately observed by the party who implements the project, the investors ask for 
a risk premium. From the firm’s point of view, this risk premium adds to the opportunity cost 
of internal financing. Thus, a reduction in barriers to entry that increases the elasticity of 
demand and generates a reduction of the profits, decreases the internal sources of financing 
which, in a context of market imperfections, increases the cost of capital and undermines the 
infrastructure investment. 
Note that the smaller and younger the firm, the stronger the imperfect substitutability between 
internal and external sources of finance. Indeed, a large firm has more collateralizable assets 
which reduce the risk premium. Further, a large firm is less severely affected by informational 
asymmetries because its activity is subject to greater media coverage and financial analysts 
monitoring. Accordingly, the interest rates paid on a loan by a large company tend to be close 
to its cost of internal financing. Hence, even if higher competition reduces the actual markup 
of prices over cost it does not impede future investment for the large firms. 
   
c. Ceiling on the rate of return on capital  
A deregulation that consists in relaxing the constraint on the rate of return on capital reduces 
investment. The idea is that if such a constraint binds, the choice of factor proportion may be 
altered in favor of more capital intensive techniques relative to labor intensive ones in order to 
increase the profit that the firm is allowed to earn up to an extent that lets the ratio 
profit/capital unchanged. Said differently, by investing in additional capital the firm may 
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increase the base to which the ceiling on the rate of return is applied, resulting in a greater 
total remuneration for capital. There is then an excessive amount of investment. This well-
known argument is due originally to Averch and Johnson (1962). So reducing the rate of 
return on capital below the profit maximizing level (resulting from the imposition of a binding 
ceiling) leads to an increase in the capital stock. The higher the allowed rate of return, the 
smaller the capital stock employed by the firm. Removing the binding constraint would, 
instead, reduce the desired capital stock and therefore would reduce the investment.  
 
 
d. Privatization of public enterprises 
Product market regulatory reforms that took place in the last decades have often been 
accompanied by privatization. A deregulation that changes the ownership structure of the firm 
can affect investment in an ambiguous way.  
On the one side, public enterprises may have stronger incentives (and ability) to foreclose 
entry to competitors than private enterprises.11 A disappearing or reduced importance of a 
dominant stated-owned player, when facing a soft budget constraint may lead to a decrease in 
entry barriers for new privately owned firms.  
On the other side, public enterprises may have stronger incentives to invest than private firms 
because of a political mandate imposed on them. For instance, as part of the conduct of a 
Keynesian policy, the government may ask public companies to invest in major works to 
reduce unemployment. Public firms may also be heavy investors because of their managers' 
incentives. Those managers often behave as empire builders, because their reward in terms of 
power, monetary compensation, and perks may be related to the size of the organization. They 
alternatively may set prices below the profit maximizing to strengthen political support.12 
Therefore, one may have overexpansion and overinvestment in public enterprises so that 
reducing the public shareholding in these companies depresses the total investment. 
Overall, from a theoretical perspective, whether total investment increases after a policy 
change that implies both privatization and a lowering the administrative barriers to entry is 
not clear. In order to disentangle the multifaceted effects of privatization, Alesina et al. (2005) 
                                                          
11 See Sappington and Sidak (2003). 
12 See Peltzman (1971).  
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offers an empirical study that allows to measure whether the increase of private investment 
more than compensates the possible fall of investment in privatized enterprises. 
 
2. Empirical analysis 
In what follows, we present four papers that provide an empirical treatment of the effect of 
higher competition through entry barriers reduction, privatization on infrastructure 
investment, and entrant’s access to incumbent’s infrastructure. First, we start with the paper of 
Alesina et al. (2005) that covers the period 1975-1998 for several nonmanufacturing 
industries in 21 OECD countries. Second, we focus on the paper of Grajek and Roller (2012) 
that covers the period 1997-2006 in the telecommunication sector in 20 European countries. 
Two important indicators of a telecommunications market’s degree of development are the 
broadband penetration (measured as the ratio of the number of actual subscribers to the 
number of potential subscribers) and the quality of internet service (measured by the 
download speed of the connection). We then present the paper of Nardotto et al. (2013) that 
examines the impact of local loop unbundling on both broadband penetration and the quality 
of service by using data from 2005 to 2009 in UK where unbundling took place in traditional 
telephony network but not in cable. Finally, we discuss the work of Crandall et al. (2013) that 
examines the effects of copper-loop unbundling on household broadband penetration rate in 
OECD countries from 2001 to 2010.  
 
a. The global effect of entry barriers reduction and privatization on infrastructure 
investment. 
In their empirical assessment of the effects of product market regulation, Alesina et al. (2005) 
use time varying measures of regulation for several nonmanufacturing industries in OECD 
countries for which investment, capital, and value-added data are available.  
In order to capture the intensity of regulation, Alesina et al. (2005) uses data collected by 
Nicoletti et al. (2001), who extended the cross-sectional data contained in the OECD 
International Regulation Database. This is described in detail by Nicoletti and Scarpetta 
(2003). These data are used to construct time-series indicators of overall regulation, barriers to 
entry and public ownership from 1975 to 1998 in 21 OECD countries for seven 
nonmanufacturing industries: electricity and gas supply, road freight, air passenger transport, 
rail transport, post and telecommunications (fixed and mobile). 
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i. Reducing entry barriers 
Barriers to entry cover legal limitations on the number of companies in potentially 
competitive markets and rules on vertical integration of network industries. Alesina et al. 
(2005) constructs an index which measures the barriers to entry (comprising legal restrictions 
and vertical integration), called BEVI, that takes a value of 0 when entry is free (i.e., a 
situation with three or more competitors and with complete ownership separation between 
natural monopoly and competitive segments of the industry) and a value of 6 when entry is 
severely restricted (i.e., situations with legal monopoly and full vertical integration in network 
industries or restrictive licensing in other industries). Intermediate values represent partial 
liberalization of entry (e.g., legal duopoly, mere accounting separation of natural monopoly 
and competitive segments).  
Figure 2 plots the average across all seven nonmanufacturing industries of the index BEVI for 
the following representative countries: the United States, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, 
Germany, France, Spain, and Italy. While the first three countries reduced entry barriers 
starting from the late 1970s/early 1980s, in Italy and Spain the process did not begin till the 
1990s, and in France and Germany the changes that occurred during the 1980s were minor.  
 
 
Figure 2. Entry barriers in selected countries, 1975-1998. Notes: Countries: Germany (DEU), Spain (ESP), 
France (FRA), United Kingdom (UK), Italy (ITA), United States (USA), and New Zealand (NZL). 
 Index of entry barriers measured by the indicator BEVI. Source: Alesina et al. (2005). 
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Using a systematic econometric investigation, the authors find that their results are consistent 
with the theoretical result that a reduction in barriers to entry is likely to have a positive effect 
on investment. The reason is that a reduction in barriers to entry leads to a decrease of the 
markup and, possibly, of the cost associated with capital expansion. The penalty of expanding 
production, in terms of lost monopoly profits, is then lower. This results in greater investment. 
 
ii. Privatization of public enterprises 
Alesina et al. (2005) constructs a second index, which measures the extent of public 
ownership, called REGPO, for the same representative countries of the index BEVI.  
Figure 3 plots the average across all seven nonmanufacturing industries of the index REGPO. 
This index points to a generalized trend toward privatization. Over the considered period 
(1975-1998), the process has been rather timid in Italy and France and much more decisive in 
New Zealand and the United Kingdom. United States is the only country that does not show a 
tendency to reduce public enterprises. However, the United States had the smallest beginning 
of period level of public ownership, much below the level of continental Europe. 
 
 
Figure 3. Public ownership in selected countries, 1975-1998. Notes: Countries: Germany (DEU), Spain 
(ESP), France (FRA), United Kingdom (UK), Italy (ITA), United States (USA), and New Zealand (NZL). 
Index of public ownership measured by the indicator REGPO. Source: Alesina et al. (2005). 
 
According to the theory developed in the previous section, when it comes to public 
ownership, contrasting forces are at work. While a reduction in public ownership can be seen 
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as lowering the shadow cost of entry, agency problems and political mandates affecting the 
behavior of public managers may lead to over-accumulation of capital. The empirical analysis 
conducted by the authors suggests that the reduction in the shadow cost of entry is the 
dominant factor.  
 
b. The effect of access regulation on infrastructure investment in the 
telecommunication.  
The article of Grajek and Roller (2012) analyzes the relationship between access regulation 
and infrastructure investment in the telecommunication sector using data covering more than 
70 fixed-line telecom operators in 20 EU member states European countries from 1997 to 
2006.13 
 
i. Access to incumbents’ infrastructure: short term vs. long term efficiency 
Providing entrants with an access to incumbents’ infrastructure introduces competition that in 
turn reduces the market power of incumbents and leads to lower prices and higher surplus for 
customers. The efficiency is then enhanced in the short term. However, by reducing the 
markups of prices over marginal costs the access regulation may reduce post-investment rents 
which may hamper investments in telecommunications. This would have a detrimental impact 
on long term efficiency. Regulatory practices depend on what the policy makers consider to 
be the right balance between short term and long term efficiency. For instance unbundling - 
which consists of ensuring new entrants’ access to the incumbent fixed-line infrastructure at 
the wholesale level - has been the leading regulatory solution both in Europe and the U.S. in 
the late 1990’s but is now phased out in the U.S. while still dominant in Europe.14 
 
ii. Competition: facilities-based vs. service-based 
Parts of the infrastructure of telecommunications industries have natural monopoly properties 
that can severely hamper the potential efficiency gains from competition. For instance, the 
duplication of the copper wires constituting the local loops (which connect individual 
                                                          
13 The following countries (EU 15) are in their dataset: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The dataset also includes the following EU 12 
countries (new member states after the 2004 and 2007 accession): Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Poland, Romania, and Slovenia. 
14 While unbundling requirements were mandated in US by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, these were 
ﬁrst eliminated from the emerging broadband markets in 2003, and further drastically curtailed in 2004 also in 
narrowband markets. In the US, the incumbents’ platforms are therefore considered to be inaccessible to 
entrants, as opposed to the open-access approach endorsed by the EU. See, Renda, A. (2007) and Nardotto et al. 
(2013). 
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households to the local switch) is prohibitively expensive, at least for the purpose of an 
alternative supply of traditional telecommunication service.15 Mandated access prices offer 
the entrant an opportunity to compete with the incumbent in the retail market by leasing the 
local loop at some regulated price. The competition is then service-based. This is different 
from facilities-based competition, in which both the incumbent and the entrant own the 
essential infrastructure and no leasing arrangements are required. Most of the commentators 
are persuaded of the advantages of the facilities-based competition in terms of variety, keen 
prices and innovation, whereas the service-based competition seems to provide no other 
benefits than keen prices through the regulator-promoted.16  
 
iii. Access to incumbents’ infrastructure in European telecom sectors 
The regulatory index used by the authors for the fixed-line segment is based on the number of 
existing legal measures that facilitate one-way access to incumbents’ networks. This index 
reflects access at different levels of infrastructure (e.g., local loop unbundling, line sharing, 
and bitstream access), and is well suited to the context of international comparisons, being 
independent of country-specific costs of building infrastructure. Moreover, this index is based 
exclusively on regulatory measures and not entry or market shares, so it allows distinguishing 
regulation from competition, contrary to the OECD index used in Alesina et al. (2005) which 
is in part based on the number of entrants.  
Access regulation may have a quite different impact on the investment decisions of 
incumbents and entrants. The authors’ results suggest that regulation discourages investment 
by incumbents and that entrants’ total investment increases. However, they find that the 
impact of regulation on individual entrant’s investment is negative suggesting that investment 
by individual entrant declines with regulation that eases access even as entrants’ total 
investment increases. Therefore the increase in total entrants’ infrastructure investment is due 
to greater numbers of entrants but not to larger investments by individual entrants. 
 
iv. Regulators’ response to incumbents’ and entrants’ infrastructure investments.  
The regulatory changes are a gradual process rather than a one shot affair. The regulators 
might be then subject to a commitment problem: when the level of incumbents’ infrastructure 
stock is high, national regulators could tend to grant easier access, which would be 
                                                          
15 Both in Europe and the U.S. a typical solution to this infrastructure bottleneck was the introduction of a 
mandated access to the incumbent telephone network by means of unbundling and sharing of the local loop. 
16 See, Cave, M. (2004).  
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disincentive for incumbents to invest in the first place. Interestingly, the authors find some 
evidence that supports this phenomenon. Moreover, the data suggest that regulatory intensity 
is not affected by entrants’ infrastructure stock, so regulators seem to respond quite differently 
to incumbents’ and entrants’ infrastructure investments.  
 
v. Simulated impact of access regulation on industry investment in Europe 
telecom sector 
Facilities-based entry is likely to require substantial firm-level investment. The authors’ 
estimate suggests that increasing regulatory intensity by roughly the average change in the 
regulatory regime in EU 15 between 1997 and 2002 reduces incumbents’ infrastructure stock 
by approximately 49 percent, and long-term by as much as 72 percent. The same change in 
regulation increases entrants’ total infrastructure stock by approximately 60 percent, and long-
term by as much as 73 percent.  
They also find that the impact of entrants’ on incumbents’ infrastructure investments is 
positive, indicating that the respective investments are strategic complements. In other words, 
when entrants invest more, so do incumbents.17 This strategic effect reduces the negative 
impact of regulation on investment incentives. However they find that the negative impact of 
regulation on incumbent’s investment incentives is only partially compensated by strategic 
complementarity.  
In terms of magnitude, they estimate the overall effect of access regulation on total industry 
investment in Europe to be a loss of some €16.4 billion, which corresponds to almost 23 
percent of the infrastructure stock, over the past 10 years. 
 
c. The impact of local loop unbundling on broadband penetration and the quality of 
Internet services. 
Nardotto et al. (2013) propose an analysis of the unbundling experience that took place in 
traditional telephony network in the UK, based on two datasets, one concerning broadband 
penetration from 2005 to 2009, and one regarding broadband speed tests carried out by 
individuals in 2009.  
With local loop unbundling, entrants are able to upgrade their individual lines and oﬀer 
Internet services directly to customers by putting their equipment inside the incumbent’s 
                                                          
17 This strategic complementarity does not work the other way around, that is, from incumbents to entrants. 
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exchanges over the “last mile”. They can then install their own particular style of broadband, 
with diﬀering speeds and download limits to those oﬀered by the incumbent. 
 
i. Broadband penetration 
By using a dataset that consists of quarterly ﬁgures for all broadband lines subscribed to 
locally by end-users in the UK, between December 2005 and December 2009, the authors find 
that during the period in which entrants progressively unbundled local loops, broadband 
penetration more than doubled in the UK. However, apart from this upward trend, the local 
exchanges that experienced intra-platform competition through local loop unbundling did not 
seem to obtain higher penetration levels than those without. On the other hand, inter-platform 
competition from cable has increased local broadband penetration to a greater degree. Indeed, 
competition on cable took place for bit-stream access (i.e., when the connection is still 
managed by the incumbent) only (not local loop unbundling). Entrant with bit-stream access 
had then to focus on price competition. As a result the penetration improved. Accordingly, 
unbundling seems to have no positive effect on broadband penetration.  
 
ii. Quality of Internet services  
By combining a dataset that contains information on broadband speed tests carried out by 
individuals in 2009 with a dataset on the demographic characteristics by local exchange, the 
authors examine the impact of local exchanges inter-platform competition and local loop 
unbundling over the quality of Internet services measured as the broadband speed.  
They find that the local exchanges that are characterized by inter-platform competition are the 
ones boasting the highest average speed. Moreover they find that the local exchanges that 
have experienced local loop unbundling entry have a higher average broadband speed than 
those that have not experienced it. Accordingly, it seems that the local loop unbundling 
entrants mainly competed by oﬀering comparatively better conditions for their fastest 
connections. 
 
iii. Conclusion 
By competing over quality rather than over price, local loop unbundling did not expand the 
market penetration but rather increased the average broadband speed and consequently took 
some market shares from the incumbent (who did not increase its quality) and from the cable 
operators (whose still provide the highest quality). This is so because with local loop 
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unbundling the entrant has to install and maintain its own equipment over the “last mile”. So 
the entrants did compete in quality rather than in price as it would have been the case under 
bit-stream access. 
 
d. The long-run effect of copper-loop unbundling on broadband penetration. 
Crandall et al. (2013) examine the effects of copper-loop unbundling on household broadband 
penetration rate in 28 OECD countries from 2001 to 2010.  
Their results indicate that unbundling has had little or no effect on broadband penetration in 
the short run, but has reduced penetration in the long run. According to the authors, it may be 
the case that unbundling reduced incentives for competitors to invent and deploy competing 
platforms and failed to enable entrants to climb the ladder of investment that facilitates the 
ability to duplicate incumbents’ network facilities and thus expand the realm of infrastructure-
based competition. They also suggest that regulators have been unable systematically to 
correctly identify and price the network elements necessary for entry and then adjust prices 
over time to reﬂect the (presumably) diminishing need for unbundling as entrants become 
increasingly capable of building their own infrastructures. In many cases the regulators have 
gone further than just requiring the incumbent to make available the last-mile local loop. For 
instance, in some countries the regulators have forced the incumbent to provide other 
elements than voice service thought to be necessary for entrants to compete. It also seems that 
prices have been set at rates that have resulted in insufﬁcient investment, meaning that they 
generally do not fully reﬂect costs. 
 
 Conclusion IV)
There are two main confronting views on the link between competition and investment. On 
the one hand, conventional arguments extol the virtues of competition in ensuring both 
allocative and productive efficiencies (Smithian view) and also providing firms with the 
incentives to invest in innovation to escape from competition (pre-innovation incentives). On 
the other hand, the tradition stemming from Schumpeter puts monopoly rents at the heart of 
the innovation process (post-innovation incentives). Recent research indicates that the 
coexistence of these escape effect and Schumpeterian effect (pre- and post-innovation 
incentives), can be characterized by an inverted U-relationship. 
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Focusing on the impact of deregulation on heavy infrastructure investments, the OECD 
countries past decade experience display mixed results which depend on what the 
deregulation is about. This deregulation can concern a lowering of entry barriers, relaxing the 
constrained rate of return on capital, or a change in the ownership structure of the firm 
(privatization policy). Overall, this deregulation has led to higher investment. But studies 
more focused on the (fixed-line) telecommunications sector highlighted that promoting 
market entry through local loop unbundling may have a negative impact on network 
investment. 
A remaining question is whether the new types of investment (for example the fiber roll-out in 
the telecommunication sector) have the same feature as the old ones and so if the lessons 
learnt from the past are still valid now. More empirical work on this issue using data from the 
NGA investment would certainly help in answering this debate which can only be settled on a 
case-by-case basis. 
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